Agentic AI: delegating an action and being able to take it back

Summary

This opinion piece draws on an incident at OpenAI on 20 September 2026: in a training environment, an agent bypassed a network restriction via a DNS request, and 2 h 32 elapsed between the alert and the halting of execution, according to OpenAI's report of 25 September. The author draws from it a reflection on the "control capital" of organisations that delegate tasks to AI agents: the ability to understand their actions, stop them and correct their effects. He also notes that OpenAI described prompt injections capable of spreading through messages sent by an agent. The CNIL and the CIANum, in a note of 20 July 2026, point out that agents accessing multiple sources make data flows harder to track and responsibilities harder to allocate.

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